How successful was the policy of reformation of municipal hospitals in Japan? : Estimation of the efficiency of Japanese hospitals using a dynamic and network data envelopment analysis by KAWAGUCHI Hiroyuki et al.
 Hiroyuki Kawguchi, Kaoru Tone, and Miki Tsutsui <1> 
31 
How successful was the policy of reformation of municipal hospitals in Japan? 
– Estimation of the efficiency of Japanese hospitals using a dynamic and network data envelopment analysis 
model – 
Hiroyuki Kawaguchi 
Seijo University  
6-1-2- Seijo, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 157-8511, Japan 
kawaguchi@seijo.ac.jp 
 
Kaoru Tone  
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan 
tone@grips.ac.jp 
 
Miki Tsutsui  
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry 
1-6-1 Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo100-8126, Japan 
miki@criepi.denken.or.jp 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this study was to perform an evaluation of the policy effect of the 
current reform of Japan’s municipal hospitals. We focused on efficiency improvements both within 
hospitals and within two separate internal hospital organizations. Hospitals have two 
heterogeneous internal organizations: the medical examination division and administration 
division. We extend observation time from 3years to 6years to compare to previous version of this 
study. We also added new variable MRI as link variable.  
  Results showed that the average overall efficiency obtained with the DN-DEA model was 0.829 
for 2007. The change in efficiency scores from 2007 to 2012 was slightly lower. The average 
estimated efficiency of both the administration division and medical-examination division 
decreased. We were unable to find any significant improvement in efficiency despite the reform 
policy. Thus, there are no positive policy effects despite the increased financial support from the 
central government.   
Keyword: DN-DEA model, Japanese hospital, municipal, Malmquist index, MRI.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Japanese municipal hospitals have experienced 
financial crises throughout the last few decades. In 2007, 
the Japanese government established a set of guidelines 
for municipal governments for reform and facilitated a 
restructure of hospital operations. There are 9,000 
hospitals in Japan, half of which are owned by private 
not-for-profit organizations, and the remainder is run by 
public organizations. One thousand public hospitals are 
owned and operated by municipal governments, most of 
which have been losing money for long time. 
    As Japanese governments have huge cumulative 
deficits, it is important that municipal hospitals have 
sound financial foundations. The master plan for the 
reform of Japan’s municipal hospitals includes five steps 
from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2014 as described 
below. First, the central government designed guidelines 
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regarding proposed reforms and a timeframe for those 
reforms in fiscal year 2007. The government ordered the 
reform of all municipals hospitals according to the 
guidelines. Therefore, all reformations of municipals 
hospitals were to start in fiscal year 2007. 
The master plan for the reform of Japan’s municipal 
hospitals includes five steps from fiscal year 2007 to 
fiscal year 2014 as described below. First, the central 
government designed guidelines regarding proposed 
reforms and a timeframe for those reforms in 2007. The 
government ordered the reform of all municipals 
hospitals according to the guide-lines. Therefore, all 
reforms were to start in fiscal year 2007. 
Second, the central government ordered individual 
municipal hospitals to formulate a reform plan, including 
performance indicators for the evaluation of the reform 
within fiscal year 2008. The contents of the reform plan 
had some range of autonomy and municipal hospitals 
could freely select countermeasures. 
Third, municipal hospitals are required to annually 
report the results of the reform plan to central 
government. The first report was submitted in fiscal year 
2009. 
Fourth, municipal hospitals were required to submit 
intermediate reports on the results of efficiency 
promotion from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010 at 
the end of fiscal year 2011. 
Fifth, municipal hospitals are required to submit a 
final report on the results of the individual reform plan at 
the end of fiscal year 2014. The fiscal year 2014 is the 
deadline for the reform. If the reform has not been 
effective, then central government will request that the 
municipal hospital shut down or sell the operation of the 
hospital. 
As explained above, the guidelines of the reform 
mainly target hospital administration because the main 
objective is to reduce deficit and to reduce the amount of 
subsidies received from local government. The central 
government is more interested in the financial situation 
of the hospital than the quality of medical services. 
The guidelines illustrate several countermeasures for 
the reform of municipal hospitals. Such countermeasures 
can be grouped into four categories. The first is the 
introduction of private business management systems. 
For example, the guidelines recommend outsourcing to 
private companies and the adoption of a “Private Finance 
Initiative”. The second category is the restructuring and 
consolidation of the hospital organization. For example, 
the guidelines recommend the merging of several 
hospitals and the conversion of hospitals into long-term 
care facilities. The third category refers to a reduction in 
hospitals’ operating costs. For example, the guidelines 
propose a revision of wage systems and reductions in the 
purchase prices of medical materials. The fourth 
category is an increase in revenue. For example, the 
guidelines recommend increasing occupancy rates and 
unit values per inpatient (nearly equal to “unit revenue 
per inpatient per day”). 
Municipal hospitals can choose the countermeasures 
from the examples in the guidelines and can include their 
own reform countermeasures. Individual reform plans 
propose the recruitment of highly skilled professionals, 
further education for healthcare professionals and a 
revision of the range of medical services. Thus, each 
hospital formulates its own reform plan and then 
self-evaluates the results. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate policy effects 
of the reform for municipal hospitals in Japan. We 
estimated efficiency scores from 2007FY to 2012FY not 
only for the hospital as a whole but also for two divisions. 
In addition, we estimated Malmquist index score to 
evaluate dynamic change the efficiencies. We would like 
to consider further policy implications from the results. 
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2.  METHOD AND DATA 
   The data used in this empirical investigation 
concerns 74 municipal hospitals from 2007FY to 
2012FY in a balanced panel. There are approximately 
1,000 municipal hospitals in Japan and there is large 
heterogeneity among them. We selected municipal 
hospitals with more than 300 beds. Therefore, this 
sample may represent larger acute hospitals owned by 
Japanese municipals. The data were collected from the 
Annual Databook of Local Public Enterprise published 
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
It is a legal requirement that the local chief executive of 
municipal governments submit audited financial 
statements to the ministry. Therefore, the data should be 
accurate. Accuracy is required for DEA because it cannot 
take into account measurement errors in the data. DEA 
also implicitly assumes the correct model specification 
and the correct specification of inputs, outputs and other 
variables. 
There are two heterogeneous internal organizations: a 
medical-examination division and an ad-ministration 
division. The administration division carries out business 
management activities to contain medical expenses 
within medical revenue. The medical-examination 
division provides various medical care services directly. 
These two organizations can be described as internal 
mutual exchange services. The administration division 
provides medical beds to the medical-examination 
division, and the medical-examination division repays 
the revenue through the use of medical beds for inpatient 
services. 
The objective function of the administration division is 
to realize a sound financial situation through labor inputs 
and capital inputs. The objective function of the 
medical-examination division is to provide a certain 
amount of medical services using hospital beds that are 
maintained by the administration division at the same 
hospital. The DN-DEA model makes it possible to have 
a two-stage production structure in one hospital, that is, 
both the administration division and medical- 
examination division. The administration division raises 
funds for and maintains medical beds and expensive 
medical equipments. The medical-examination division 
uses the medical beds and medical equipments to provide 
medical services. Furthermore, the medical- examination 
division earns medical revenue in return for medical 
services and the administration division collects the 
revenue from the medical-examination division and 
manages financial matters. Previous literature that 
adopted traditional DEA models in the study of Japanese 
hospitals did not consider intermediate products in a 
hospital. In case of the DN DEA model, we can use link 
variables as intermediate products for both divisions. 
This benefit of the DN DEA model (compared with the 
traditional DEA model) is that it makes it possible to 
reflect on the actual situation. We adopted two link 
variables in our model. 
   In addition, if we add variables related to the 
administration division in the traditional DEA model, we 
would suffer from inadequate correspondence between 
inputs and outputs. For example, the administration staffs 
do not directly engage in the production of medical 
services. In the case of the traditional DEA model, this 
input may correspond with the number of inpatients as an 
output. However, the relationship between the 
administration staff and the number of inpatients would 
cause an undesirable bias in the efficiency estimation. 
Therefore, the DN-DEA model conceptually reduces bias  
in the estimation of efficiency by both considering the 
multiple-step production structure and by excluding 
inadequate interactions between inputs and outputs. 
However, we do not consider more detailed divisions in 
this study. For example, we did not consider 
pharmaceutical or clinical laboratory divisions. 
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Many previous studies that have adopted traditional 
DEA models to examine Japanese hospitals have focused 
on the activities of the medical-examination division. 
These studies typically adopt the number of doctors and 
nurses as inputs and the number of inpatients and 
outpatients as outputs. Therefore, such studies do not 
contain the activities of the administration division, by 
way of either input variable or output variable. However, 
the DN DEA model enables us to consider activities in 
both divisions. We can observe the activities of the 
administration division separately from the 
medical-examination division. 
 The inputs, outputs, links and carry-overs of the DN 
DEA model are described below. For Division 1 
(administration division), we adopted two labor inputs 
and three capital inputs. The administration division does 
not directly provide a medical service to patients. The 
division is in charge of providing medical beds to the 
medical-examination division and maintains a sound 
financial situation for the hospital. Therefore, 
administration staffs should manage the financial 
situation of the hospital. They also receive subsidies 
from the municipal government and manage the 
reimbursement of issued hospital bonds. Maintenance 
staffs maintain all the hospital buildings for hospital 
activities. As labor inputs, we used both the number of 
administration officers and the number of maintenance 
officers. All labor inputs are full-time equivalents (FTEs). 
However, we did not consider staff differences in 
productivity and wage levels. As capital inputs, we used 
the interest cost for financial arrangements and municipal 
subsidies to cover deficits.  
 For the output of Division 1, we intended to adopt 
the “balance ratio of medical incomes to medical 
expenses”; the break-even point has a value of 1 and a 
surplus has a value exceeding 1. However, using a ratio 
as an input or output makes the convexity issue of DEA 
problematic [1]. Emrouznejad and Amin [2] 
recommended not using constant returns to scale when 
there is a ratio in the input/output variables. Therefore, 
we decomposed the ratio to medical income and medical 
expenses: the numerator was used as output for Division 
1 and the denominator as input for Division 1.  
 For Division 2 (the medical-examination division), 
we adopted four labor inputs: the number of doctors, 
number of nurses, number of assistant nurses and number 
of medical technologists. All labor inputs were 
corresponding value of FTEs. For the outputs of Division 
2, we adopted the number of inpatients per operation day, 
the number of outpatients per operation day and the 
number of beds in emergency units. In Japan, there is no 
gate-keeping system involving general practitioners. 
Therefore, hospitals accept a large number of outpatients 
to attract potential inpatients. In this study the number of 
beds in emergency units was used as a surrogate variable 
for emergency care service because we could not 
distinguish between emergency care patients and 
ordinary patients from the data source.  
 Previous studies regarding efficiency estimations 
on Japanese hospitals did not include emergency medical 
services. A core function of public hospitals in Japan is 
to ensure a quick response for emergency patients. 
However, some municipal hospitals have closed their 
emergency units to reduce costs despite the increasing 
need for emergency medical services. Although we 
consider that the evaluation of efficiency of municipal 
hospitals should include the number of emergency 
patients, we were not able to obtain numbers from the 
available data. Therefore, we adopted the number of 
emergency beds as a proxy for the number of emergency 
patients. This proxy variable has limitations because it 
did not control for the difference in severity of 
emergency patients, the quality of emergency medical 
service and the occupancy rate of the emergency beds. 
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The existence of a link variable is one of the key 
differences between the DN model and the BB model. 
The link variable is an intermediate product that acts 
simultaneously as an output for Division 1 and an input 
to Division 2. Using an intermediate product, we can 
evaluate multiple production steps among divisions in 
one DMU. Tone and Tsutsui [3] present four possible 
scenarios. For example, the “fixed link value case” 
means that the linking activities are unchanged. 
There are peculiar characteristics in case of municipal 
hospitals comparing with private hospitals in Japan. Due 
to election tactics of governors, municipal hospitals tend 
to do overinvestment in both beds and expensive medical 
equipment. The decision of the investment was ordinary 
made by the administration division. We should count on 
the effect of capital investment from the administration 
division to medical-examination division.  
We set the both “number of beds” and “number of 
tesra of Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanners” 
as a link variable from Division 1 to Division 2. We 
assumed that Division 1 is in charge of the funding and 
maintenance of medical beds and expensive medical 
devices. Division 1 supplies these beds and devices to 
Division 2. Division 2 uses the medical beds and devices 
for delving medical care services to patients. We adopted 
a non-discretionary “fixed” link, where the linking 
activity remains the same. The reason for this is that it 
would be unusual for the medical-examination division 
to negotiate with the administration division to change 
the number of beds. The administration division also has 
an incentive to generate sufficient medical revenue (to 
offset the medical expenses) and to use all available beds. 
MRI scanners are expensive medical device and which 
are very popular in Japanese hospitals. The “tesra” 
means capacity of Magnetic power and means fineness 
of imaging diagnosis. We set the number of tesra of MRI 
scanners as proxy variable for expensive medical 
devices. 
We used “average revenue per inpatient per day” as a 
link variable from Division 2 to Division 1. We assumed 
that the average revenue is the consideration to be paid to 
Division 1 for the beds from Division 2. The average 
revenue per inpatient may represent the density of 
medical care services. We adopted the “as-output” link, 
where the linking activity is treated as an output from 
Division 1. The reason for this is that this matter is not 
negotiable between the two divisions. Division 1 should 
be efficient enough to provide higher density medical 
services under the given resource constrains. 
There are other peculiar characteristics in case of 
municipal hospitals comparing with private hospitals in 
Japan. According to the soft budget constraint, municipal 
hospitals can keep huge cumulative deficit. We need to 
consider negative effect of the deficit in our evaluation. 
The carry-over variable is one of the benefits of using 
a DN model compared with a BB model. A DMU 
ordinarily continues activities over several terms. 
Furthermore, some inter-temporal factors can affect its 
efficiencies. The carry-over variable makes it possible to 
account for the effect from connecting activities between 
continuing terms. The carry-over variable has four 
characteristics in Tone and Tsutsui [3]. For example, 
“desirable (good) carry-over” variables are treated as 
outputs and a comparative shortage of carry-overs is seen 
as inefficiency.  
We set the “balance account of the public enterprise 
bond (hospital bond)” as an undesirable (bad) carry-over. 
The hospital bond was chosen as the carry-over because 
municipal hospitals issue these bonds to raise funds for 
capital investment in terms of hospital beds. The 
municipal hospital gradually redeems the issued bond 
from any revenue surplus. We adopted the “undesirable 
(bad)” carry-over; thus, the connecting activity from 
Period 1 to Period 2 is treated as an input. The reason for 
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this is that newly built hospitals are more attractive to 
patients but represent a heavier fiscal burden in terms of 
repaying the principal. Therefore, to treat the public 
enterprise bond as a carry-over reflects accurately the 
competitive condition of the market in which patients 
can freely access any hospital. However, we did not 
consider both the average life and interest rate of the 
hospital bonds.  
According to the first principle that a public hospital is 
expected to accomplish a policy goal with a minimum 
budget, we selected an input-oriented model. We adopted 
both constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns 
to scale (VRS) models in the analysis. We also employed 
Malmquist productivity index (MI) number approach and 
decomposed MI to technological change (frontier-shift) 
and efficiency change of non-best-practice DMUs 
(catch-up). In case of Malmquist index, we selected CRS 
model according to the results from Tatje and Lovell [4]. 
Names of all variables in the analysis are provided in 
Table1. 
 
Table 1: Names of all variables in the analysis 
 
 
The number of inpatients per operation day decreased 
3 percent point from 2007FY to 2012FY. The number of 
outpatients per operation day decreased 6 percent point 
from 2007FY to 2012FY. The balance ratio of medical 
expense to medical income improved 5 percent point (in 
the red) from 2007FY to 2012FY (Figure1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Main outputs of sample hospitals from 
2007FY to 2012 FY 
 
3. RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the key statistics of the estimated 
efficiency scores obtained by the DN model. On the 
Table 3, the first row shows the efficiency scores of the 
overall hospital organization as determined by the DN 
model. The second row shows the efficiency scores of 
the administration divisions of the sample hospitals. The 
third row shows the efficiency scores of the 
medical-examination divisions of the sample hospitals. 
From the results of DN model, we obtained four key 
findings. 
First, the average overall efficiency by the DN model 
was 0.91 (VRS model) for 2007FY. The average 
efficiency score estimated by the DN model was almost 
same level with the average efficiency level estimated in 
previous studies on Japanese municipal hospitals [5-8].  
Second, the average level of relative efficiency on 
2012FY is slightly less than on 2007FY in overall. The 
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average efficiency score was 0.91 for 2007 and 0.89 for 
2012FY (VRS model). 
Third, because of the advantage of the network 
structure in the DN model, we can observe the efficiency 
change separately for different internal organizations. 
The average level of estimated period-divisional 
efficiency of the administration division decreased from 
0.901 in 2007FY to 0.881 in 2012FY (VRS model). The 
average period-divisional efficiency of the 
medical-examination division also decreased from 0.921 
in 2007FY to 0.909 in 2012FY (VRS model). On 
average, there was no significant efficiency improvement 
in both divisions for the 6-year period. 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated efficiency scores by DN-DEA 
 
The Malmquist productivity index is suitable for 
evaluate dynamic change of efficiency of the samples. 
The average level of the Malmquist productivity index 
was 1.022 from 2007FY to 2012FY. 
We can observe the efficiency change separately for 
different internal organizations. The average level of 
estimated Malmquist index of administration division 
increased from 1.58 from 2007FY to 2008FY, and 1.049 
from 2011FY to 2012FY (CRS model). On the contrary, 
the average level of Malmquist index of the 
medical-examination division almost unchanged from 
0.968 in 2007FY to 2008FY, and 1.002 from 2011FY to 
2012FY (CRS model)(Table 2). 
Table 2: Estimated Malmquist index scores by 
DN-DEA 
 
The Malmqusit index of the administration division 
improved year by year about 6%.On the contrary, the 
Malmquist index of the medical-examination division 
seems to have no change during 2007FY-2012FY.To 
investigate the reason of the improvement of 
administration division, We decomposed the Malmquist 
index to frontier shift and catch up. The improvement of 
the Malmqusit index of administration division may 
come from “Frontier shift” rather than “Catch up” 
(Figure 3). As a conclusion, we cannot admit the policy 
effect in terms of efficiency improvement. However, 
there may be “technological change” in administration 
division as frontier-shift effect. We could not conclude 
that what is the technological change in administration 
division. However, we suspected that accounting 
standard had temporally loosened by financial support to 
hospital bond from central government to municipals. 
 
 
Figure 3 :Malmquist Index of administration division 
from 2007FY to 2012FY 
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4. DISCUSSION 
Results from the efficiency estimation showed that the 
dynamic change in efficiency scores from 2007FY to 
2012FY improved slightly but are not statistically 
significant. Thus, there are no positive policy effects 
despite the announcement. In addition, estimation results 
of malmquist index indicated an improvement of 
malmquist index in the administration division. The 
improvement of the Malmqusit index of administration 
division may come from “Frontier shift” rather than 
“Catch up” effect.  
We suspect that the Frontier shift effect came from 
change of accounting standard for municipal hospitals 
and implicit subsidy from central government to the 
municipal hospitals.  For example, central government 
permitted to issue “special hospital bond” with interest 
subsidy from central government and allowed to replace 
bad debts with cash from the special hospital bond. Total 
issuance of the special hospital bond reached 57,254 
million yen (about 477 million dollars) on 2008FY. 
This study would have several limitations that need to 
be addressed. For example, we were unable to use 
variables regarding the “quality” of medical services and 
the “severity” of patient condition. Therefore, we 
assumed that the sample hospitals would be 
homogeneous in terms of quality of service and severity 
of patient condition. We could, however, narrow the 
range of samples according to the number of hospital 
beds to ensure the homogeneity of the sample hospitals 
on some level. We used the number of beds in 
emergency units as an output and used total number of 
medical beds as the link variable. This double counting 
of medical beds could affect the results in some way.  
There are other limitations regarding the control of 
several factors, which would influence to the estimated 
efficiencies. For example, the price of medical services, 
which is insured by public health insurance, changes 
every two years in Japan. The price increased on average 
by 2% in fiscal year 2008. However, sample hospitals 
have affected the change of reimburse rate of public 
health care insurance. Therefore, the relative efficiency 
scores would have small influence. Many Japanese acute 
hospitals decided to voluntarily change their 
reimbursement system from “fee for service” to “per 
diem based on diagnosis groups (DPC)”. This study did 
not fully consider these external environmental changes 
in the Japanese hospital market. 
Regarding policy implications, we did not consider 
both the relative costs of the two divisions and the 
relative costs to improve efficiency in each division. For 
example, one division may be less efficient on average, 
but the other may be more costly so that a given 
efficiency improvement is more beneficial. When 
playing an active role in policy implementation, we need 
to consider relative costs in addition to the efficiency 
scores. Future study will require a larger sample set and a 
more complex model. 
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